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Cover
1
Half-Title
2
Title
3
Copyright
4
Dedication
5
Contents
6
Acknowledgments
10
Introduction
11
1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century
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1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth
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2 Seven principles of theory selection
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2.1 Firm Foundations
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2.2 Internal Coherence
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2.3 External Coherence
28
2.4 Explanatory Power
30
2.5 Unity
31
2.6 Parsimony
31
2.7 Fruitfulness
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3 The case for instrumentalism
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3.1 The firmest foundation
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3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness
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3.3 Advantages over alternatives
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3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism
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3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium
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3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis
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3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism
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3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism
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3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba’s dialecticalism
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3.3.7 Conclusion
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4 Disarming initial concerns
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4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?
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4.2 Not a firm foundation?
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4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?
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4.4 Three promissory notes
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4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?
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4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?
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4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?
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5 Conclusion
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2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves
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1 Our capacities to care about our past and future
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2 The problem of possible future selves
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2.1 Possible futures
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2.2 Possible psychologies
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2.3 Possible choices
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2.4 A very real problem
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3 Morality as the solution?
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4 Is the problem too contingent?
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5 Two nonsolutions
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5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures
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5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency
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6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem
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3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative
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1 Interests in diachronic cooperation
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2 Three types of interests
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2.1 Involuntary interests
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2.2 Semivoluntary interests
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2.3 Voluntary interests
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3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative
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4 Just conscience?
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5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?
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6 Conclusion
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4 Three Unified Formulations
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1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation
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1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests
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1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests
134
1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests
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1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation
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2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation
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3 Advantages over Kantian ethics
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3.1 Firmer foundations
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3.2 Greater internal coherence
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3.3 Greater external coherence
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3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony
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3.5 Greater fruitfulness
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4 Conclusion
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5 The Moral Original Position
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1 Rawls’ Original Position
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1.1 Rawls’ Kantian rationale
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1.2 Rawls’ reflective equilibrium rationale
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1.3 Rawls’ public reason rationale
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2 Some common critiques
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2.1 Kantian critiques
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2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques
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2.3 Public reason critiques
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3 The case for a Moral Original Position
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4 Corroborating the critiques
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4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques
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4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques
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4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques
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5 Conclusion
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6 Rightness as Fairness
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1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness
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1.1 The Principle of Negative Fairness
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1.2 The Principle of Positive Fairness
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1.3 The Principle of Fair Negotiation
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1.4 The Principle of Virtues of Fairness
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2 Rightness as Fairness: a unified standard of right and wrong
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3 Rightness as Fairness in practice: principled fair negotiation
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3.1 Kant’s four cases
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3.2 How numbers should count: trolleys, torture, and organ donors
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3.3 World poverty
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3.4 Distribution of scarce medical resources
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3.5 The ethical treatment of animals
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4 Conclusion
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7 Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism
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1 Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism
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1.1 Libertarianism: attractions and critiques
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1.2 Egalitarianism: attractions and critiques
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1.3 Communitarianism: attractions and critiques
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2 The case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism
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3 Additional advantages
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3.1 (Qualified) fair negotiation over divisiveness
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3.2 Resolving the scope and requirements of justice
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3.3 Resolving the ideal-nonideal theory distinction
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4 Conclusion
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8 Evaluating Rightness as Fairness
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1 Firmer foundations
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2 Greater internal coherence
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3 Greater external coherence
232
4 Greater explanatory power
234
5 Greater unity
236
6 Greater parsimony
236
7 Greater fruitfulness
237
8 Conclusion
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E1
240
Notes
241
Bibliography
254
Index
270
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