Global Power Shift

Enrico Fels
Jan-Frederik Kremer
Katharina Kronenberg *Editors*

Power in the 21st Century

International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World

Springer

Global Power Shift

Comparative Analysis and Perspectives

Ample empirical evidence points to recent power shifts in multiple areas of international relations taking place between industrialized countries and emerging powers, and between states and non-state actors. Yet there is a dearth of theoretical interpretation and synthesis of these findings, and a growing need for coherent approaches to understand and measure the transformation. This edited series aims to bring together scholars from all major world regions as well as different disciplines in order to discuss and possibly blend their different approaches and provide new frameworks for the understanding of global affairs and the governance of global power shifts.

For further volumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/10201

Enrico Fels • Jan-Frederik Kremer •
Katharina Kronenberg
Editors

Power in the 21st Century

International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World

Springer

Editors
Enrico Fels
Bonn University
Center for Global Studies
Institute for Political Science
and Sociology
Bonn
Germany

Jan-Frederik Kremer
Bonn University
Center for Global Studies
Institute for Political Science
and Sociology
Bonn
Germany

Katharina Kronenberg
Bonn University
Center for Global Studies
Institute for Political Science
and Sociology
Bonn
Germany

ISBN 978-3-642-25081-1 e-ISBN 978-3-642-25082-8
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-25082-8
Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012935687

Preface

Power has no limits.
(Tiberius Caesar)

For millennia the study of power has been an essential part of human philosophical endeavours. Already in ancient times Greek and Indian philosopher as well as Roman and Chinese statesmen tried to answer questions regarding the essential nature of power, its sources and how to use power wisely in order to keep and increase it. However, despite these efforts power in essence remains to some extent a mystery. In International Relations (IR) myriads of researcher have tried to understand what power in IR might look like, which shapes it can take and how they work and interact.[1]

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century there is a great debate going on that deals with the question whether there is a power shift taking place between the developed countries and the so called emerging or reemerging powers (mainly China, Brazil, India and Russia, but also other countries like Indonesia or South Africa). This debate is not only taking place in academic circles, but has also largely influenced public discourses around the globe. While there is a lot of academic work on the empirical implications of a perceived power shift between the western world and emerging powers (e.g. Rachman 2008; Grevi 2009; Stephens 2009; Zakaria 2009), a comparable debate has not taken place on questions connected with these implications, e.g. how power shifts in international relations can actually be captured methodological in the 21st century – comprised of an arena that is largely characterized by a complex economical, political, financial and ecological interdependence. Likewise, questions regarding the changing nature of power as an ability or function in such an environment are barely debated on a theoretical level. Especially when it comes to answer the questions of what the nature of power in today's interstate relations might look like, which forms it might

[1] For a longer discussion on the debate see Chap. 1 from Fels in this volume.

take, which new sources it can be based upon or which ways may have become more effective than others for exercising it internationally, one discovers both theoretical confusion and cacophony. Various concepts and approaches that were developed in the decades after the Second World War compete for explanatory power. On a general level Realist and Neo-Realist scholars regard hard power capabilities (military and economic resources) as the most important sources of power in IR (cf. Waltz 1990; Mearsheimer 1995; Grieco 1995). Joseph Nye, on the other hand, argues for soft power, as the ability to attract others and win their support for own positions, or smart power, a combination and application of soft and hard power resources in a 'smart' way, as the most important sources and ways for exercising power in international affairs (Nye 1990a, b; 2011).

David Baldwin (2002: 178–179) again introduced a multi-dimensional concept of power; power in his concept can be analyzed in terms of its scope, weight, means and domain. To understand power in its total character, Barnett and Duval (2005) also developed a multi-level approach towards power: They presented an approach which combined material, relational and structural components of power. Barnett and Duval distinguished on an analytical level between compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power, asserting that those four forms would be able to explain the whole picture of power in IR (Barnett/Duval 2005).

Other scholars – most prominently Stephen Krasner (1985) and Susan Strange (1987, 1988, 1996) – have argued for structural power as being the most important source of power in IR. Additionally, other scholars have brought power concepts from the field of sociology into the debate and argued for non-intentional, institutional, impersonal or discursive power as important power variants (cf. Guzzini 1993, 2005). Lukes for example pointed out the importance of the relationship between power and interests, as well as the importance of winning the "hearts and minds" of another actor in order to successfully exercise power (Lukes 2005). Other authors in IR – especially postmodern and critical scholars – understand power as being productive in terms of creating subjectivity, norms and discourses. Power in this understanding constitutes subjects by normalizing them throughout the overt and covert effects of norms and discourses (cf. Focault 1972). These effects cannot be controlled by a single actor or small group of actors. Furthermore, norms and discourses become own sources of power, controlling the behaviour and belief-system of human beings. Power in this understanding is "making up people" (Hacking 1986). Proponents of Max Weber's definition of power as a relational concept have followed another, quite different idea on power (Weber 1947; Baldwin 1979, 1980, 2002; Dahl 1957). Thus, every interested observer of the debates on power in IR will recognize that power in IR seems to have not only a Janus face as a defining characteristic feature, but – to stick to the image – should best be understood to have the polycephalic countenance of Hekate, Brahma or Svantovit. There is now such a variety of concepts and understandings of power in our discipline that someone might find it quite hard to stay informed and not to lose his head in the discussion. The aim of this book is therefore twofold: first, to shed some light onto the discussion on this important topic by outlining the competing strands and concepts in the literature, second – and with respect to the altered

international environment of the 21st century – to contribute to the debate by introducing novel approaches and understandings or new applications of older concepts in order to show how scholars might understood power in our changing world in this new century.

The concept of power is still today "one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations" (Gilpin 1981: 13) and a useful definition of power in IR "remains a matter of controversy" (Waltz 1986, 333). Indeed, this book likewise will not be able to give a conclusive answer towards the question "What is power?". However, by providing approaches and studies for perhaps the two most important sectors of IR –International Security and International Political Economy (IPE) – the volume seeks to widen the understanding of power in our discipline with regards to developments at the dawn of the 21st century. To do so, on the one hand, the book focuses primarily on international relations and on power in the stricter IR sense. Accordingly, concepts of power which have been developed under the prime objective to understand power in sociological and linguistic terms (Focaultian, discoursive, impersonal and other postmodern approaches), on the other hand, will not be explored in this volume.

In order to achieve these aims, this volume brings together scholars working in the fields of IR, IPE, economics and finance as well as security studies. By approaching the subject from a variety of angles and introducing new theoretical designs and empirical analyses, they seek to foster the debate particularly in those realms that continue to be important for modern nation states: security and economics. Furthermore, this book not only includes contributions from authors with different academic backgrounds, but – even more important – very different ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives. Due to this basic feature, the volume is not designed to develop one specific and exclusive concept for understanding the nature of power in IR. In fact, it intends to combine the work of scholars working on issues within the fields of security and economic into a single volume in order to outline both differing and similar understandings of power (and its multiple facets) within the academic community working on the international realm, tackle different aspects, combine existing theoretical considerations with empirical evidence and present novel ideas for grasping power in the modern world.

The book's first part, *Theoretical Considerations about Power*, deals with the various theoretical aspects of power. The contributions concentrate not only on power discourses within IR on a general level and possible shifts of it among international actor, but discuss established and novel understandings of power in its various dimensions and present possibilities for adapting them to the 21st century. The volume's second part, entitled *International Security and Power*, encompasses contributions that deal with power developments in one field of IR, which has probably gained the most attention since the establishing of our discipline. The section assesses old and new sources of international power and analyses implications they have in the currently changing global environment. *International Political Economy and Power*, the final part of the book, contains contributions, which deal with power in the realm of trade, finance and economics. The authors examine how economic power should best be understood, in which ways economic

interdependence and the governance of the global economy affect the international power status of states, and how economics has been used in recent times to gain and exercise power in a globalized world.

The volume's first chapter, *Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers*, starts with a general overview of the competing understandings of power in IR. Enrico Fels argues that one can distinguish three power concepts: power-as-resources, relational and structural power. Combining the allegiance of middle powers and a relational understanding of power, Fels proceeds and analyses Australia's allegiance as a case study in order to give an example for measuring a possible power shift between the United States and China. Whereas in economic terms Australia's relationship with China became much more interdependent in the last decades, Canberra continues to strengthen its security ties with Washington, demonstrating the limited fungibility of power between power areas.

Cornelia Beyer continues the theoretical debate in Chap. 2, *Hegemony and Power in the Global War on Terrorism*, by using the US hegemony between 2001 and 2008 as well as US leadership in the Global War on Terror as an example in order to debate a modern concept of hegemony, combining realist, constructivist and critical IR perspectives while distancing her concept from the simple realist notion of unipolarity. She finds that the US hegemony is based on material and ideological power and validates her thesis with a qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with scholars and practitioners from the the EU und ASEAN and their evaluation of US dominance.

Gitika Commuri critically discusses Joseph Nye's well-known concept of soft power in Chap. 3. In *Are you Pondering what I am Pondering? Understanding the Conditions Under which States Gain and Loose Soft Power* she uses Nye's original articulation of the concept – in terms of persuasion and attraction of others and hence without the gradual inclusion of economic power Nye himself added later. She concentrates on the conditions in which states may gain or lose soft power and investigates the relationship of these conditions with hard power capabilities, the role of the international structure and, particularly interesting, to a relational understanding of power. The article finishes by clarifying why states can gain and lose soft power in another state at the same time, since a state's soft power often only intentionally aims one group, i.e. certain elites or the population in the targeted state. Commuri argues that besides the internal conditions of nation states and the structure of the international system, historic conditions are responsible for significantly shaping the ability of states to possess and project soft power.

In Chap. 4, *Towards a New Understanding of Structural Power – "Structure is What States Make of it"*, Andrej Pustovitovskij and Jan-Frederik Kremer develop a new understanding of structural power after discussing existing approaches of structural notions of power, including Susan Strange's concept. By pointing out the importance of states' needs and goods for their structural power position in international relations and by introducing an approach for linking these to the exercise of power in structural terms they explore the very sources of structural power. They show that by influencing their baskets and the likelihood of becoming

credible outside options for other actors in international negotiations, states can gain structural power in international affairs.

Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil commence the volume's second part, which concentrates on aspects of power in the field of security. In Chap. 5, *Nuclear Weapons and Power in the 21st Century*, they deal with probably the most destructive weapons mankind has so far developed and discuss possible effects of novel developments in the field of nuclear arms on future power relations. The two authors show that although nuclear weapons make massive destruction possible, states managed in the past to find a delicate balance of terror that brought stability during the Cold War. With the technological advancement of many nations especially from the Global South, however, the main pillar of the previously quite successful nuclear order – the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – comes under rising pressure from latent nuclear powers. Frühling and O'Neil argue that while one should not conclude that latent nuclear powers will turn into de facto ones quickly, their new nuclear capabilities will nevertheless have wider systemic effects as a new type of power resource.

Sarah Kirchberger shows in Chap. 9, *Evaluating Maritime Power: The Example of China*, that in order to measure and compare national naval strength it is essential to employ an innovative multi-facet framework that goes beyond the traditional consideration of numbers, vessel types and employed personnel. After outlining the concept of sea power she proceeds with a closer look at China's naval modernization strategy and the impact the Chinese naval build-up has on the Asian naval balance of power. Following her critical assessment of the Middle Kingdom's maritime capabilities, Kirchberger concludes that although China's maritime power might be growing, it is – especially if compared to some neighbouring nations – relatively weak considering its high dependency on maritime transport, its vast coastline and the size of its Exclusive Economic Zone.

In Chap. 8, Roxana G. Radu draws attention to the increasing importance of information and communication technology both as a source of national power as well as a threat to it. After conceptualising cyber security and the novel vulnerabilities states face in an increasingly digitalized national and international environment, Radu concentrates on the role that informational power plays in trans-national relations. She concludes *The Monopoly of Violence in the Cyber Space: Challenges of Cyber Security* by using the empirical cases of Estonia, Georgia and South Korea to outline policy responses by countries that experienced critical cyber attacks in the recent past.

In Chap. 10, *Drones as Future Air Power Assets: The Dawn of Aviation 2.0?*, Louis-Marie Clouet concentrates on the important tactical and strategic impacts of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) for 21st century power relations. Taking recent military experiences as a starting point, he outlines how UAVs are already changing the ways air power is gained and exercised by Western and non-Western militaries, e.g. by using drones for better battlefield awareness. He sketches out likely future developments within this important field and shows that drones are set to fundamentally alter the traditionally air power hierarchy as they allow for military air assets that are cheaper (compared to the costs of traditional jets and bombers) and

easier to manufacture (particularly due to dual-use technologies) – something that particularly benefits developing countries. Given the rising global demand for drones and the increasingly tougher industrial competition, Clouet concludes with a call for a stronger European cooperation in order to avoid falling behind militarily and technologically.

Following a reflection of the European discourse's development on traditional power politics in the decades after the end of the Cold War, Magnus Christiansson delves into the concept of military balancing and shows in Chap. 7, how this particular concept, which was long absent in the European security debate, continues to be relevant when it comes to certain European sub-complexes such as the Baltic Sea region. He proceeds in *The Military Balance in the Baltic Sea Region – Notes on a Defunct Concept* by concentrating on military capabilities of regional states, sorts their various balancing patterns into three basic strategies – assurance, avoidance or self-realization – and examines the impact the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 had in altering these strategies. The results of his analysis show that balancing theory helps to get a better grasp of regional state's security behaviour and compensates for blind spots of theories dealing with governance or complex interdependence.

In the book's 6th Chapter Jost Wübbeke uses a constructivist approach to address the question of how important natural resources serve as tools or sources of power in the 21st century. After examining existing approaches towards resource power and offering an insightful assessment of todays distribution of key resources, Wübbeke analyses in *Three Worlds of Natural Resources and Power* the importance of resources in international relations by using Wendt's conceptions of three different ontological perceptions of world politics that form three idiosyncratic role models of interstate relations: Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian. He points out that depending on the ontological perception of international relations by the international actors involved and the role model applied by them, the importance of resources as sources of power varies significantly and therefore there is neither an automatic link between natural resources and power nor between scarcity and conflict.

Benjamin J. Cohen starts the volume's third part, which concentrates on international economic aspects of power, by closer examining monetary power in international affairs. In Chap. 11, *The International Monetary System: Diffusion and Ambiguity*, he addresses the question of the ontology of power and rule-setting in the international monetary system. By distinguishing between two dimensions of monetary power – autonomy and influence – Cohen offers an innovative approach towards power in the international monetary system. Within this context he examines and analyses different developments, outlining a diffusion of power among states as well as between states and non-state actors rather in the dimension of autonomy than in the dimension of influence. Cohen introduces the concept of *leaderless diffusion*, meaning that leadership in the system has been more scattered than relocated. He argues that a power shift has taken place from few very powerful states towards a growing number of autonomous actors, especially when it comes to rule-setting abilities within the monetary system. Furthermore, he outlines that

on the level of governance, a distinction should be made between the individual state and the global system and thus offers an elaborated approach towards understanding monetary and economic power in the 21st century.

In *Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance* Stefan A. Schirm shows how regional and emerging powers such as Brazil and Germany strive to exercise leadership in international negations. By looking at negations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the founding of the G20 and both countries bids for permanent seats in the UN Security Council, Schirm explores in Chap. 12 the necessary conditions for regional powers to gain followership in the international community. In concentrating on followership as a core condition for success and failure of emerging and regional power's leadership in global governance, he succeeds in developing a thoughtful methodology that facilitates analysing the exercise of power by middle and great powers.

In Chap. 13, *A Power Through Trade? The European Union and Democracy Promotion in ACP States,* Dennis Nottebaum tests whether the EU, which he defines as a trading power, has the ability to exert power and to influence the internal development (especially the promotion of democracy) of its trading partners from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP states) by using the access to its internal market as a bargaining chip. Nottebaum assesses the European impact on trade relations operationalized as trade openness by using a two-stage least squares model (2SLS) with panel data covering the years from 1991 to 2008. Thereby he provides evidence that the EU has considerable success in linking trade issues with issues of democracy promotion in the ACP states.

Maaike Okano-Heijmans outlines in *Power Shift: Economic Realism and Economic Diplomacy on the Rise*, the book's 14th Chapter, how latecomer countries are much more willing to use economic tools for strengthening their position in international negotiations and for intervening in their domestic economies to achieve political goals than economically developed countries in Europe and North America. To do so she reconceptualises the economic dimension of power by adjusting existing theoretical concepts that link economics and politics, to current realities and contemporary debates. In analysing Chinese foreign policies she is able to validate her initial assumptions and confirms concerns of the future success of foreign policies from European countries.

In the last chapter of this volume, *Exploring China's Rise as a Knowledge Power*, Maximilian Mayer uses China as a case study in order to point to an often neglected aspect of national power: knowledge und technology. He argues that a truly comprehensive understanding of how China could (again) become a hub of world politics requires an historical exploration of the Chinese position within the global political economy of knowledge. Drawing from the ideas of Susan Strange, Robert Gilpin, and Joseph Schumpeter, he explores the global knowledge power politics in which China's rise is embedded and concludes that, in sum, China's knowledge power has obviously increased. However, China largely relies on creeping processes of knowledge creation that neither reduce its technological dependence nor result in a sharp increase of knowledge power. On a theoretical level, Mayer's case study illustrates that, despite the alleged conceptual elusiveness

of knowledge, a reasonably coherent and differentiated assessment of qualitative and quantitative alternations of knowledge power is possible.

Finally, carrying out this book project benefitted from the support, ideas and work of many individuals and institutions. First and foremost we would like to thank the authors not only for participating in the project and presenting fresh ideas and concepts, but also for their patience and efforts during its various stages. Furthermore, we are particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. Xuewu Gu, director of the Center for Global Studies (CGS) at the University of Bonn, for supporting the project right from the start with great enthusiasm, productive discussions and financial backing. Thanks are furthermore due to our other colleagues at the CGS – Maximilian Mayer, Andrej Pustovitovskij, Pavlina Schmitz, Ben Behschnitt, Tschen-Ing Liu, Markus Nagel, Katharina Below, and Jan-Paul Franken – for their helpful suggestions and assistance. We are also grateful to the International Studies Association (ISA) for allowing us to present our papers at its 52nd Annual Convention in Montreal (Canada) in March 2011 and discuss selected analyses and views expressed in this volume with scholars from all over the world. For a very friendly and professional cooperation we furthermore wish to express our gratitude to the economics and political science section of our publisher Springer, particularly to Barbara Fess. Finally, we would like to extent thanks to our colleagues at the Department for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn – not only for providing a fruitful working environment, but also for personal and academic encouragements during the many phases of this book project.

Enrico Fels, *Jan-Frederik Kremer*, *Katharina Kronenberg* Bonn, Spring 2012

References

Baldwin, D. A. (1979). Power analysis and world politics: New trends versus old tendencies. *World Politics 31*(2), 161–194.

Baldwin, D. A. (1980). Interdependence and power: A conceptual analysis. *International Organization*, *34*(4), 471–506.

Baldwin, D. A. (2002). Power and international relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B. Simmons (Eds.), *The handbook of international relations* (pp. 177–191). Thousand Oaks: Sage Press.

Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005a). Power in international politics. *International Organizations, 59* (Winter), 39–75.

Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral Science*, *2*(3), 201–215.

Foucault, M. (1972–1977). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–77*. Brighton: Harverster.

Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grevi, G. (2009). *The Interpolar world: A new scenario*. Occasional Paper – No. 79, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Grieco, J. M. (1995). The Maastricht treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research program. *Review of International Studies*, *21*(1), 21–40.

Guzzini, S. (1993). Structural power: The limits of neorealist power analysis. *International Organization*, *47*(3), 443–478.

Guzzini, S. (2005). The concept of power: A constructivist analysis. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, *33*, 495–522.

Hacking, I. (1986). Making up people. In T. Heller, M. Sosna, & D. Wellbery (Eds.), *Reconstructing individualism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Krasner, S. D. (1985). *Structural conflict: The third world against global liberalism*. Berkley: University of California Press.

Lukes, S. (2005). Power and the battle for the hearts and minds. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33*(3), 477–493.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1995). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, *19*(3), 5–49.

Nye, J. S. Jr. (1990a). The changing nature of world power. *Political Science Quarterly*, *105*(2), 177–192.

Nye, J. S. Jr. (1990b). Soft power. *Foreign Policy*, *80*, 153–171.

Nye, J. S. Jr. (2011). *The future of power*. Public Affairs, 2011.

Rachman, G. (2008). Is America's new declinism for real? *Financial Times* (November 24).

Stephens, P. (2009). Financial crisis marks out a new geopolitical order. *Financial Times* (October 9).

Strange, S. (1987). The persistent myth of lost hegemony. *International Organization*, *41*(4) (Autumn), 551–574.

Strange, S. (1988). *States and markets – An introduction to international political economy*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Strange, S. (1996). *The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, K. (1990). Realist thought and neorealist theory. *Journal of International Affairs*, *44*, 21–37.

Waltz, K. N. (1986). Reflections on theory of international politics: A response to my critics. In R. O. Keohane (Ed.), *Neorealism and its critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Weber, M. (1947). *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: The Free Press.

Zakaria, F. (2009). *The Post-American world: And the rise of the rest*. London: Penguin Books.

Contents

Contributors

Dr. Andrew O'Neil Professor and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane. Editor-in-chief of the Australian Journal of International Affairs and ex officio member of the National Executive of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Chief Investigator on the Australian Research Council's Linkage Project Australian Nuclear Choices

Andrej Pustovitovskij Lecturer and Ph.D. Candidate, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn, apust@uni-bonn.dein

Benjamin J. Cohen Louis G. Lancaster Professor of International Political Economy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Review of International Political Economy and – among the many other positions he held during his career – also served as member of the Editorial Board of International Organization (until 2010) and member of the Advisory Board of the Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy (2005–2009)

Dr. Anna Cornelia Beyer Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Hull, c.beyer@hull.ac.uk

Dr. Louis-Marie Clouet Associate Research Fellow, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris. Director of Research in Intercultural Management, Institut de Management et de Communication Interculturels (ISIT), Paris

Magnus Christiansson Associate Lecturer at the Department for Security and Strategy, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, magnus.christiansson@fhs.se

Dr. Gitika Commuri Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences and Education, Department of Political Science, California State University Bakersfield, gcommuri@csub.edu

Enrico Fels Lecturer, Managing Editor of the series "Global Power Shift – Comparative Analysis and Perspectives" (Springer) and Ph.D. Candidate, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn

Dr. Stephan Frühling Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. Deputy Director of Studies, Military Studies Program, Australian Command and Staff College. Managing editor 'Security Challenges'. Chief Investigator on the Australian Research Council's Linkage Project on Australian Nuclear Choices, stephan.fruehling@anu.edu.au

Dr. Sarah Kirchberger Assistant Professor, Department for Chinese Language and Culture, Asien-Afrika-Institut, University of Hamburg

Jan-Frederik Kremer Lecturer, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn and Ph.D. Candidate, Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr-University Bochum

Katharina Kronenberg Lecturer and Ph.D. Candidate, Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn

Maximilian Mayer Lecturer and Ph.D. Candidate, Managing Assistant of the Center for Global Studies, University of Bonn

Dennis Nottebaum Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW) and member of the Graduate School of Politics, University of Münster

Dr. Maaike Okano-Heijmans Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Hague. Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD), Australian National University

Roxana Radu Research Fellow, Center for Media and Communication Studies, Central European University Budapest, and Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, roxana.radu@graduateinstitute.ch

Dr. Stefan Schirm Professor of Political Science and Chair for International Relations, Ruhr-University Bochum. Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy and Visiting Scholar at the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), John Hopkins University, Washington D.C. (2010–2011)

Jost Wübbeke Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Global Politics and the Environmental Policy Research Centre, Free University Berlin, j.wuebbeke@gmail.com

Part I
Theoretical Considerations About Power

Chapter 1
Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers

Enrico Fels

Within the last two decades, China has been the most seriously debated emerging power seen by academics, politicians and large parts of the public alike to be able to effectively challenge the dominant position of the United States of America (US) in global as well as Asian-Pacific affairs.[1] Indeed, after having enjoyed a brief moment of global unipolarity following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Washington's current situation has changed remarkably. Some points are particularly worth mentioning. To begin with, the world's former *hyperpuissance* (Hubert Védrine) has to recover from the worst global economic crisis since 1929. The US unemployment rate is up to almost 10% (far away from the 4% in 2000), its federal budget deficit was estimated at 1.4 trillion USD in 2011 (Younglai 2011) and total outstanding public debt skyrocketed to 14.7 trillion USD in September 2011 (US Treasury 2011). Secondly, the US continues to be heavily engaged in large military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military missions in these two war-torn countries do not only continue to cost US tax payers a great deal of money[2] and account for the death of hundreds of US soldiers and local

I am grateful to Robert Ayson, Hugh White, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Yusuke Ishihara, Jared Sonnicksen, Gudrun Wacker and Maximilian Mayer for earlier discussions on this topic. All remaining errors are my own. This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 52nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Montreal (Canada) on March 16th 2011. See Fels 2011a.

[1] See for instance: Abeysinghe and Lu 2003; Vaughn and Morrison 2006; Christensen 2006; Deng and Moore 2004; Friedberg 2005 and Wagener 2011.

Although being frequently referred to in academic and popular debates, Asia-Pacific is not a fixed region but comprises around 42 states from East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania in the Western Pacific Ocean. Often (though not always) the US, Russia and India are – due to their respective strategic relevance – also included as regional actors. This paper follows that understanding.

[2] According to the liberal think-tank *National Priorities Project* the costs for both wars have summed up since 2001 to more than 1.27 trillion USD until September 2011. See National Priorities Project 2011.

E. Fels et al. (eds.), *Power in the 21st Century*, Global Power Shift,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-25082-8_1,

civilians, but – more important from a strategic perspective – have bogged down the US military for some years to come. Finally, Washington is confronted with an increasingly assertive and economically rising China in Asia-Pacific, a region that according to high-ranking US politicians has "become more closely interlinked than ever before" (Obama 2009) with the fortune of America, "is a key driver for global economic growth" (Kirk 2009) and a place, "where much of the history of the 21st century will be written" (Clinton 2010).

Without any doubt, China's development is crucial for understanding the changing perceptions of the region's importance in wider global affairs as well as the shifting power structure within the region itself.[3] China has experienced astonishing growth rates of about 8–12% over the last 30 years. This development has increased the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in real terms to more than half of the American GDP and may overtake the United States within the next two decades.

China has furthermore integrated itself in the US-led global economic system and has gained considerable economic weight within the Western Pacific. In fact, due to the astonishing development of the Chinese economy, Asia-Pacific's regional economic structure has become much more Chinese-centred in the last years (Gaullier et al. 2007; Drysdale 2010b). Additionally, while growing economically, China has succeeded in building an impressive technological capacity as well as a strong domestic innovation system (Mayer 2011; CGS-Forschungsgruppe Wissensmacht 2011). Its long-lasting economic progress has furthermore allowed Beijing to finance an impressive military build-up, permitting the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to gain operational abilities to likely prevail in a military encounter with US forces close to Chinese borders, e.g. over the status of Taiwan (Office of the Secretary of Defence 2010). Thus, China's reappearance as a major power in the Western Pacific combined with its growing military posture may mark, as some authors have noted, the end of the 'Vasco da Gama-period' of Western dominance in the Western Pacific (e.g. White 2005).

Most of the above mentioned facts and developments are widely acknowledged. Over the last years, China's rise in the key region of international affairs in the 21st century has triggered a lot of research and writing on transitions, power shifts and changes in balance.[4] Indeed, after the passing of US primacy in regional economic affairs as well as Beijing's historic position in the region, it is only logical to assume that important changes in the economic basis and military capabilities of China cannot go without effect on the region's security and power structure.

This chapter, however, argues that in order to assess potential power shifts in Asia-Pacific it is important to rely on a measurement of power in international affairs that differs from the traditionally used equalization of rising resources and rising power. After taking a closer look at some important theoretical aspects of the

[3] On the importance of studying the regional level of international relations see Fawn 2009 as well as Buzan and Waever 2008.

[4] See for instance Goh 2004; Medeiros 2005; Power 2005; Ross 2006; Shambaugh 2004/05, 2005; Gill 2007 or Levin 2008.

nature of power in international relations, the chapter will outline why the allegiance of certain regional states – states, which cannot be attributed great power status but are still relevant for the overall system they are embedded in – should be seen as a telling factor in regional power relations. Following a detailed account of the attributes of that group of states, this new measurement of power is applied to the case of Australia, one of Washington's oldest allies in the region and a very close trading partner of Beijing.

Power in International Relations

Most scholars of International Relations (IR) as well as political practitioners agree that "power is the platinum coin of the international realm, and that little or nothing can be accomplished without it" (Gelb 2009: 26). As Alexander Wendt has shown, basically all IR theories have the underlying assumption that power is important in international relations (Wendt 1999: esp. 97). However, studying power in political science is a very arduous task. Twenty-five years ago, Kenneth Waltz noted that even defining power "remains a matter of controversy" (Waltz 1986: 333). So far, this controversy has not been resolved; instead, it is likely to continue for some time to come. Many approaches have been developed in IR in order to gain a better understanding of power in international affairs, its underlying mechanisms, the ways different actors use power as well as the varying importance of its sources.[5] All this has contributed to making research on this topic "one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations" (Gilpin 1981: 13).

On the whole, it is possible to distinguish between three main understandings of power in international relations: power-as-resources, relational power and structural power. The first strand is reflected by Waltz' (1979) emphasis on "capabilities" and "attributes of units" and Morgenthau's (1954) approach towards "elements of national power".[6] According to this power-as-resources understanding, certain material and immaterial factors within/of a state can be used to measure national power.[7] Power is thus basically seen as a possession of states. Proponents of this perception of power argue that adding up these different factors not only equals a state's national power, but does subsequently allow the power distribution among states in the international arena to become visible and is to be taken as the structure of international power. This notion of power continues to be very popular among political scientists and practitioners and is probably the main lens through

[5] Good overviews are provided by Wrong 1979; Clegg 1994; Baldwin 2000; Mattern 2008.

[6] However, Morgenthau's landmark book also shows that he has a relational understanding of power as he defines power as a "psychological relation between those who exercise is and those over whom it is exercised". See Morgenthau 1954: 25.

[7] Waltz, for instance, mentions population, territory, economy, resource endowment, military strength, political stability and competence. See Waltz 1979: 131. For Robert Gilpin only three resources (military, economic and technological means) indicate power. Gilpin 1981: 13.

which China's re-emergence is seen today (e.g. Treverton and Jones 2005). Joseph Nye rightfully argues that this view is fostered by believing that equalling power with possession of certain resources "makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable" (Nye 1990a: 26).

The second understanding of power perceives it as a causal relationship between actors in international affairs in which one state affects the behaviour of another state by using own material and immaterial resources. Max Weber was probably the first political scientist to understand power in this regard. He described power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber 1947: 152). His understanding of power strongly influenced Robert Dahl's more popular definition according to which "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do" (1957: 202f). Power thus comes from an actual or potential (social) engagement between two or more actors, it is therefore not equal to a state's resources, but based on a state's ability to effectively use own material and non-material[8] attributes in a specific context to gain power over another actor. As this shift from a concept of power-as-resources to a relational understanding allows for a more complex understanding of power, some authors have noted that it constituted a revolution in power analysis (Baldwin 2000: 178).

The third major understanding depicts power in structural terms. Proponents of this approach see power mainly related to the establishment of or control over structures in international relations. According to Susan Strange, structural power is the ability "to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises" (Strange 1988: 25). Also Christensen (1978) emphasises the need to consider a situation's setting in which the interactions between two or more actors occur and Stephen Krasner proposes a structuring 'meta-power', which is "the ability to change the rules of the game" (1985: 14). Strange holds that "the possessor of [structural power] is able to change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others" (1988: 31).[9] Others add that structural power in international politics is the combination of "the effects of positions of a state in a given structure that work conductively to its benefit in interaction with

[8] Also Joseph Nye's 'soft power' approach is based on a relational understanding of power. See Nye 2004. It should be noted, however, that 'soft power' is difficult to generate and even harder to wield *intentionally* in order to influence another actor. In Chap. 3 of this volume Commuri deals more closely with this kind of power.

[9] Other (post-)structural approaches argue that A's ability to influence the relevant elites of B as well as the influence of discourses, role models and social structures within states ('third' and 'fourth' face of power) should be seen as separate forms of power. See for instance Lukes 2005; Chase-Dunn 1989; Digeser 1992; Campbell 1998. However, while both 'faces' can indeed be seen as exercises of power, a relational conception of power can nevertheless very well capture most (if not all) of these aspects. See Guzzini 2000: esp. 62ff.



Fig. 1.1 Forms of relational power (Lebel 2006)

other states, regardless of whether this state is aware of the existence of these positions or not" (Gu 2010: 198).

Indeed, such a structural notion of power presents a formidable theoretical challenge to the relational concept of power *if* the international power structure in question is to be understood as solid, one-dimensional, all encompassing, basically unchangeable and ignorant of involved actors' behaviour. However, as Susan Strange has noted in her writings, there should be at least four different important structures in international affairs, all equipped with a separate (but interlinked) power structure of their own and different actors competing for a place at the top of the hierarchy.[10] In consequence, proponents of structural power have to explain why these international structures "defined as persistent patterns of power relationships in specified scope and domains, cannot be usefully studied using the relational concept of power" (Baldwin 2000: 185).

It is obvious that a relational understanding of power is capable of explaining power structures in various issue-areas between several actors, involved in interactions overlapping in time, space and taking shape in several forms (see Fig. 1.1). Strange herself in fact adopts a relational conception of power when describing a security structure as "a framework of power created by the provision of security by some human beings for others" (1988: 45). Thus, *structures in international affairs can be understood as repeated interactions between states*, enabling

[10] According to Strange, these four structures are within the issue areas security, production, finance and knowledge. See Strange 1989.

some stronger states to consistently gaining advantages over weaker ones within these relationships.

Following the relational conception, power in international relations has to be seen in several dimensions, especially in *scope*, *domain*, *reliability*, *costs* and *means* (Baldwin 2000: 178f). *Scope* refers to different issue-areas, meaning that an actor may have power over other actors in issue-area X, but not necessarily in issue-area Y. *Domain* concerns the number of other actors affected by state A (the number of Bs under A's influence) or the size of state B. This means that a state may have power in one part of the world but not automatically in another region or that it is able to exercise influence over a small state but not over a bigger one. *Reliability* of power refers to the likelihood that A affects the behaviour of B. Evidently, a state with a higher success rate of influencing others is more powerful than a state with a lower success rate.[11] *Costs* reflect the efforts A has to incur in order to influence B's behaviour as well as the costs B has to bear while submitting to A's demands (including opportunity costs). Finally, *means* are crucial for understanding power. Although there are different ways of categorizing the various means relevant in international relations, the most important are probably symbolic, economic, diplomatic and military means (e.g. Baldwin 1985). The first includes A's appellation to some shared norms, symbols and/or values in order to shape B's behaviour (e.g. the rights of asylum seekers, acceptance of peaceful protests or respect of national sovereignty). Economic means are characterized by ways of influencing the flow of goods, services and currencies (this may include sanctions on one end of the spectrum as well as preferential trade agreements and economic aid at the other end). Thirdly, practical diplomatic engagement is a useful means for exercising power, e.g. by negotiation or provision of valuable information. Finally, military means encompass the use – or threat of use – of military force. For good reason, this component has gained the most attention by writers on power in the international realm. Additionally, it is key for understanding the Sino-American competition in Asia-Pacific and the region's security affairs. The ability to apply as well as to resist military force – especially under the current semi-anarchic international system – continues to be the *ultima ratio* of international politics (Gelb 2009: 163; Carr 1964: 109).

However, as shown above, it is important not to equate a nation's military forces with its military power. Power only comes from influence and therefore capacities have to be seen on an issue-to-issue basis to gain that influence. Being able to field troops equipped with sophisticated weaponry is barely half of the story; what matters more is being able to use ones' military means to change the other side's behaviour. This is the lesson Washington had to learn in Vietnam, the experience

[11] Interestingly, Waltz also acknowledges this. Despite dismissing the relational concept of power, he agrees that "the stronger get their way – not always, but more often than the weaker" (1993: 169). Surprisingly, this closely reflects – unintentionally? – a position of Immanuel Wallerstein, who held some years before Waltz that "the stronger 'get their way' more frequently than the weaker" (1986: 331).

Moscow made in Afghanistan and the task with which the world's largest military alliance is currently struggling with in the exact same country. Additionally, what is valuable within a certain domain and scope can be less useful in another theatre and different issue-area. For instance, armed forces designed to fight a conventional large-scale military conflict in middle Europe may prove less capable of defeating Islamic warlords in Somalia or Mujahedeen across the Hindu Kush – and vice versa. And military troops are likewise not very useful in negotiations on international climate change cooperation, currency issues or debt relief programs. Power in politics is simply much less fungible than e.g. money in everyday economics. Actor A equipped with conventional military means can thus be more or less powerful – depending on the concrete issue area and B's attributes.

Ranking of States

Considering the importance of the relational aspect of power, it becomes clear that hierarchies of states face some difficulties.[12] Scholars have nevertheless tried to rank powers from lowest to highest, labelling some nations as great powers and other as middle or minor ones (see Fig. 1.2).

Usually, hierarchies follow the power-as-resources understanding and base their grading on material (and sometimes also non-material) attributes of states.[13] Such an approach is plausible as it allows for a putative 'objective' measurement of national power. Critics have rightly noted, however, that this approach threatens to be a "lump concept of power which assumes that all elements of power can be combined into one general indicator" (Guzzini 2000: 55). Additionally, as shown above, the fundamental problem remains: How to compare (and combine) the



Fig. 1.2 Example of a hierarchisation of states according to their accredited power (Kugler and Tammen 2004) (It is of course possible that there is more than just one dominant power at the top of a hierarchy)

[12] A comprehensive theoretical discussion of hierarchy is presented by Lake 2009. See Scholvin (2011) for a valuable overview of current hierarchisation models.

[13] See for instance Cline 1977; Tellis et al. 2000; Virmani 2005; Merrit and Zinnes 1989; Taber 1989; Kugler and Arbetman 1989; Noya 2005; Nolte 2006; Casetti 2003.

power *relations* among different actors? In this context, Dahl noted, that "it is difficult enough to estimate relative influence within a particular scope and domain; it is by no means clear how we can 'add up' influence over many scopes and domains in order to arrive at total, or aggregated, influence" (1991: 27). Thus, indices, which treat power only as those resources a national government has command of, obviously do not present the whole picture.

On the other hand, measuring power in relational terms is not only more complex but seems to be less feasible for analytic enquiry. Proponents of the relational power approach rightly stress that political outcomes are the key to identifying power relations. Baldwin, for instance, holds that in order to measure the power of A (domain) over B within a certain issue area (scope) one has to look at seven aspects: "(1) the probability of B's compliance; (2) the speed with which B complies; (3) the number of issues include [. . .]; (4) the magnitude of positive or negative sanctions provided by A; (5) the costs to A; (6) the costs to B; and (7) the number of options available to B" (2000: 181). Obviously, such a meticulous relational approach is hard to apply for making general statements on international politics (see Keohane 1986: 187). With regard to regional security, how can IR scholars possibly add up the political outcomes of every political interaction between states in a certain region in order to get a general understanding of the region's power distribution (and rank states accordingly) when it comes to security affairs?

There is, of course, a solution to this. Critics of a power-as-resource approach have – for good reason – pointed to the fact that "what constitutes a 'good hand' in card games depends on whether one is playing poker or bridge" (Baldwin 2000: 179). However, even with a relational understanding of power, it is still very useful to take into account the tangible and intangible resources of states, simply because in the international arena states – or better: their governments – cannot only play several card games at once, but (even more important) also *know* which of these card games are more significant to them than others. Dismissing resources and taking a minimalist 'policy-contingency approach'[14] would mean to neglect the obvious differences between nations and their resource basis as well as losing the academic ability to reduce reality's complexity to some extent for the sake of a greater analytical understanding of general processes and relations. Power resources *are* the raw materials that are indispensable for later power relationships. Thus, while keeping in mind that every resource's de facto value for gaining power (by using or not using it) depends on the dimensions outlined above, it is useful to roughly classify states according to the general *potential* of their resources identified to be relevant in the respective 'card game' in order to get a first good grasp of a region's affairs. As White has noted: "No country in history has exercised great power without great wealth" (2010: 19). Indeed, historically there seems to be a causal relationship between the quantity of some resources and political outcomes in certain international issue-areas such as military and security affairs (see Mearsheimer 2001: 55–67).

[14] This captious approach would basically mean to judge power relations on a case-by-case basis without being able to interconnect the various cases. See Sprout and Sprout 1965.

Great Powers in the Regional Power Hierarchy

With regard to Asia-Pacific's security 'card game', this means first to have a look at the distribution of resources understood to be relevant for the provision of national (and regional) security. Subsequently, regional states in Asia-Pacific can then be ranked into three categories: great, middle and small powers. Labelling some states as great powers has a long tradition (see Buzan and Waever 2008: 33f). Additionally, most writing in IR has been concentrated on the influence of great powers and superpowers (see Danilovic 2002). It is important to distinguish between both types: While the first have great weight in many scopes in their regional domain, the latter are also able to continuously influence other regions as well. The category of superpower thus only seems to be useful for a global perspective and will not further be considered here.[15] In the field of security, great powers are largely identified by their conventional military capabilities. Among many other authors, Mearsheimer has noted that in order "to qualify as a great power a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war" (2001: 4). Additionally, he emphasises the need for great powers to have a nuclear deterrent in order to prevent nuclear blackmailing by other actors (ibid.). Obviously, his understanding clearly takes into account relational effects of military resources. A power-as-resources ranking of great powers would therefore identify five great powers in Asia-Pacific: the US, China, Russia, India and Japan (see Fig. 1.3).

Yet, a relational understanding of power demands some important changes to that list of five great powers. Looking at Beijing's and Washington's influence in regional security relations makes clear that both have to be attributed great power status. For the other three, such a ranking is not that easy. Considering Russia's political influence in Asia-Pacific, for instance, it is hard to see Russia as a great power in Asian-Pacific security affairs (see Amirov 2010). Russia is much more engaged in Europe and Central Asia – militarily, economically and strategically (Fels 2009; Rozman 2010). Given its status as the world's largest country, Russia has officially been a part of Asia-Pacific since 1689, when it signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the Middle Kingdom. However, the shape of the Russian armed forces in this part of the world, the economic (and demographic[16]) development of the Russian Far East (RFE) and – as Russian Premier Vladimir Putin has noted – the "poor links [of the RFE] to the economic, information and transportation network to the rest of Russia" (cited in Nation 2010: 51) raise serious doubts about a Russian great power status in regional security affairs even if one takes a power-as-resources

[15] Currently, there are only one and a half super powers on the global level. The US continues to be able to exercise relevant influence on many issue-areas in all world regions. Within the last two decades, China indeed expanded its ability to change the behaviour of other states especially in the field of economics in many regions such as Africa, Central Asia and South America. It largely replaces the Soviet Union/Russia in this role.

[16] The population of the Russian Far East Federal District has declined to only 6,5 Mio. – as much as Laos or Papua New Guinea (RIA Novosti 2010).

	United States	China	Russia	Japan	India
Total area	9,826,675 km^2	9,596,961 km^2	17,098,242 km^2	377,915 km^2	3,287,263 km^2
Population (July 2010)[a)]	307,212,123	1,338,612,968	140,041,247	127,078,679	1,156,897,766
GDP (2009)[1)]	US$ 14.26 trillion	US$ 4.909 trillion	US$ 1.255 trillion	US$ 5.068 trillion	US$ 1.236 trillion
Defense budget (2009)	US$ 693.6 billion	US$ 70.3 billion[b)]	US$ 41.05 billion	US$ 52.6 billion	US$ 35.88 billion
Arms export[c)] (2009)	US$ 6,795 million	US$ 870 million	US$ 4,469 million	–	US$ 22 million
Soldiers (2009)	1,580,255	2,285,000	1,027,000	230,300	1,325,000
Nuclear forces operational/ total inventory	2,468 / 9,600	~180 / 240	4,650 / 12,000	virtual capability	n.a. / 60 – 80
ICBM[d)]	Minuteman III (13,000 km)	DF-5A (13,000 km)	Satan (16,000 km)	virtual capability	Agni-V (5,000 km, in development)
Aircraft carriers	11	program + renovation of former Soviet Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier	1	1 (helicopter carrier)	1

Central Intelligence Agency 2010a-e; IISS 2010: 31, 33, 222, 225, 359, 361, 398-399, 408-409; Federation of American Scientists 2010; SIPRI 2010.
a) Estimate.
b) Official defense budget at market exchange rates
c) Figures are SIPRI trend indicator values (TIVs) expressed in US$ millions at constant (1990) prices
d) Example

Fig. 1.3 Power-as-resources ranking of probable great powers in Asia-Pacific (Wagener 2010: 6)

approach. This does not mean to dismiss Russia's regional abilities entirely – but one should not overstate them either. Moscow simply cannot successfully engage in a major confrontation with China or the US in Asia-Pacific, rather, its economical and technological resources[17] gives Moscow the "role of a spoiler" (Nation 2010: 50) in some regional security relations such as the Korean question – something that is important to keep in mind for other regional actors, but not sufficiently for Russia to be ranked at the regional top. Additionally, due to the RFE's internal problems it is very likely that even in the next one or two decades Russia cannot influence other actors in regional military affairs more that it can now. On the contrary. Given its

[17] Arms and energy deals rather than pro-active and resourceful diplomatic activities will continue to be the main expression of Moscow's regional engagement.

situation, Moscow "will remain a second tier player" (Ibid.: 53) in Asia Pacific's post-Cold War security environment for many years to come.

Japan is another example of the importance of a relational understanding of power. Despite having the necessary military resources identified to be relevant for security relations, Tokyo has not acted as a great power in the security domain since losing World War II (see Maull 1990; Samuels 2007; Aoi 2004). Ever since then Japan has exercised an impressive restraint in the field of security (in stark contrast to its behaviour in regional and global economics). It is certainly true that Japan has developed capable armed forces regardless of Article IX of its constitution. However, by taking a relational understanding of power, it becomes obvious that Tokyo has not only aligned itself very closely with Washington, but has – so far – shown an extremely strong reluctance to take on a more assertive role in regional security affairs as well and acted more like a much smaller state (Hatch 2009). Thus, considering Japanese behaviour towards the field of security, Japan should – despite being an economic giant – currently not be placed at the top of the regional security hierarchy (see also Yoshihide 2009).

India, finally, is a more tricky case. In the past, New Delhi has barely been involved in Asian-Pacific security affairs, but was concerned with internal challenges and its relationships with Islamabad and Beijing. This, however, has changed considerably within the last decade. After its economic integration with Asia-Pacific, New Delhi has – with some delay – not only acquired quite impressive military capabilities, but has also begun to become strategically more committed to the region (Fels 2011b). This change of mind can be exemplified by joint statements regarding strategic cooperation with Japan (December 2006, October 2010) or Indian participation in the Malabar naval exercises since 2003. Of course, Pakistan and China, two important Indian neighbours, still capture most of New Delhi's attention. Nevertheless, India has not only developed a much more self-confident approach towards Asian-Pacific security affairs in recent years, but also its traditional sphere of influence – the Indian Ocean – is gaining more importance due to rising energy dependence of countries in Asia Pacific (see Cook et al. 2010: 31). All in all, this allows India to be considered in the top tier.

Identifying Middle Powers in Asia-Pacific

Middle powers have been significantly less studied in IR than great powers and their relations. In fact, the concentration of mainstream literature in the field of security on great powers has led to an almost general dismissing of the role that other states in international relations play; non-great powers are and were mostly considered to be part of 'the rest'. Such thinking, however, not only neglects important aspects of the relational understanding of power, but also dismisses essential components of the international system itself. As one scholar argues, "a different approach to theory development, such as that illustrated by middle-power theory, might lead us to theories [. . .] that actually reflect reality in its greater

complexity" (Neack 1995: 227). Additionally, for a relational understanding of power it is particularly important to concentrate on middle powers for assessing power relationships (and power shifts) as competing great powers often seek support from middle powers in their quest for regional influence (Wight 1978: 50–52, 63–65).

Only few scholars have paid attention to middle powers (or second-tier countries, as they have sometimes been called) within the last decades. One of them, Carsten Holbraad, argues that "given that the existing state system, in common with many earlier systems of modern history, contains a substantial number of units which obviously are neither great nor small states, a study of the role of middle-sized powers seems a natural complement of the traditional concern with great powers" (Holbraad 1984: 3). Interestingly, in his extensive work on the topic, Holbraad also shows that notable authors like Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357), Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709–1785), Adam H. D. von Bülow (1757–1807), Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Hans Christian Ernst von Gagern (1766–1852), Friedrich Ludwig Lindner (1772–1845) and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) were in one way or another concerned with the role of second-ranked powers in international affairs (Ibid.: 10–45). Summing up their different findings and ideas, Holbraad concludes that in history, though middle powers were largely understood as materially less well-equipped than great powers, they were nevertheless viewed as defenders of the balance of power as well as providers of peace and order (Ibid.: 41). He furthermore outlines that accrediting middle powers with an international legal status of their own (comparable to that of great powers) was attempted by second-ranked powers during the Congress of Vienna, the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*), the Versailles Peace Conference, the League of Nations as well as in the United Nations (Ibid.: 45–66). From time to time middle powers were successful in gaining special recognition (such as in the League of Nations), mostly, however, they failed in light of the fierce resistance by the primary powers (and even the smaller ones, too).

Within the last decades, a couple of definitions of "secondary regional powers" (Huntington 1999: 47) have been suggested in order to characterise middle powers' role in international relations. Following Chapnick (1999) one can sort the various approaches towards these second-ranked powers into three basic understandings: the *hierarchical*, *functional*, and *behavioural* model. To begin with, the *hierarchical* understanding of middle powers in the literature closely resembles the notion of historic writers on this group of states. Holbraad summarizes that "middle power, or its synonyms, has been a relational concept, in the sense that it has been defined or described with reference to other classes of the system, especially that of the principal powers" (Holbraad 1984: 42). Others add that these historic authors on the subject "saw a hierarchical, stratified international system in which objective capability, asserted position, and recognized status combined to produce three classes of states" (Dewitt and Kirton 1983: 22) – great, middle and small powers. The problem with such an

understanding is that it basically equates status with material capabilities – the same misleading notion as the power-as-resources understanding. It is, however, useful in pointing out that some states below the great powers are equipped with sufficiently more material and immaterial capabilities than smaller states – which in turn allow them to act more self-sufficient in the international arena than the smaller ones.

The *functional* model rests on the assumption that middle powers perform – just like great powers – special functions in international relations due to their material capabilities and political willingness to engage in the international arena. In this regard, Gelber (1946) observed that "since major powers are differentiated by their greater functions from the rest, the Middle Powers [sic] ask that they be distinguished from the lesser ones by the same criteria". The functional approach towards second-tier states dates back to Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong, who based his understanding on three 'functional criteria': the extent of a state's involvement in an issue, its interests, and its ability to contribute to the situation in question (cited in Chapnick 1999: 74). Later authors added that "informally, middle powers have often come to assume such responsibilities, and to gain special influence in functional areas where their interests have appeared strongest" (Wood 1988: 4). Unfortunately, with the exception of Hume Wrong, no other author specified the functions they attributed to middle powers. Wrong's understanding, however, has certain strength as it outlines the importance of those states other than great powers that also have capabilities to influence relations among states in some issue-areas and in specific situations. In turn, this perspective also includes a relational understanding of power.

The *behavioural* model links middle power status to a variety of specific behaviours in international affairs. According to Andrew Cooper and his colleagues, second-tier states can best be identified by "their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy" (1993: 19). Other authors have defined middle power behaviour as that of conflict managers, moral powers and status seekers (Wood 1988: 19f).[18] Robert Keohane added that a middle power is "a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution" (1969: 296). Robert Cox observed that second-tier states are committed to "orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system" (Cox 1989: 826). Such a strategic behaviour was understood to be essential to their national interest (Pratt 1990: 151). It was furthermore seen as a way to avoid being totally dominated by great powers (Glazebrook 1947). Interestingly, a behavioural understanding of middle powers was sometimes combined with a functional one (see for instance Lyon and Tomlin

[18] This is quite closely related to a functional understanding of middle powers.