

AXEL MOELLER

Alternative Initial Public Offering Models

*Max-Planck-Institut
für ausländisches und internationales
Privatrecht*

*Studien zum ausländischen
und internationalen Privatrecht*

368

Mohr Siebeck

Studien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht

368

Herausgegeben vom
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches
und internationales Privatrecht

Direktoren:
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Axel Moeller

Alternative Initial Public Offering Models

The Law and Economics Pertaining
to Shell Company Listings
on German Capital Markets

Mohr Siebeck

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e-ISBN PDF 978-3-16-154000-4

ISBN 978-3-16-153894-0

ISSN 0720-1141 (Studien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht)

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

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The book was printed by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren.

Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgements

This thesis was admitted for the degree of Doctor of Law (*doctor iuris*) at the Bucerius Law School during the second trimester in 2015. The research described herein was conducted during my research associateship with the Institute of Law and Economics at the University of Hamburg and subsequently as a research associate with the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law.

Three professors have played a pivotal role in my academic development as a postgraduate and doctoral student in Hamburg. First, I am very grateful to my first advisor, Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernd Schäfer, for his trust and encouragement towards my endeavors of an interdisciplinary thesis topic and for his highly valuable input toward the economic part of my thesis. Equally important, my second advisor, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Karsten Schmidt, has substantially contributed to my insights and understanding of the German business and capital markets law, all of which was highly beneficial to the legal deliberations in this book. Finally, I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Reinhard Zimmermann for the valuable support and counsel in all of my endeavors and for the unparalleled opportunities offered during my research associateship with the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law.

Good friendship has been equally invaluable to me over the past years. Dr. Henric Hungerhoff, Dr. Karoline von Loeper, Donata von Enzberg, Dr. Clemens von Doderer, Konrad von Lyncker, Dr. Arletta Guenther-Lübbers, Yong Nguyen, Klaus-Peter Thießen and Lennart Kähling have been and continue to be very dear friends since earlier and more recent times. Also my current and former office colleagues at both the Institute for Law and Economics and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Dr. Sönke Häsel, Sina Imhof, Eike Hosemann, Samuel Fulli-Lemaire and Jakob Gleim were valued companions!

The third pillar of support has undoubtedly been my family in Namibia and Germany. Their unconditional faith and guidance has been contributing to my well-being in ways immeasurable. I dedicate this book to them.

Clearly, I cannot claim that this piece of work is the result of a purely solitary endeavor brought about under pain-staking personal privations. And

though I claim this dissertation to be an individual work, I must acknowledge that I could never have reached the heights or explored the depths without the friendship, support, guidance and efforts of the above mentioned persons and institutions.

Oxford 2016

Axel Moeller

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