

AXEL MOELLER

Alternative Initial Public Offering Models

*Max-Planck-Institut
für ausländisches und internationales
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Axel Moeller

Alternative Initial Public Offering Models

The Law and Economics Pertaining
to Shell Company Listings
on German Capital Markets

Mohr Siebeck

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Axel Moeller

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