LOUIS NICHOLAS DAVOUST, MARSHAL OF FRANCE, MAY 19, 1804: DUKE OF AUERSTADT: PRINCE OF ECKMUHL.

LOUIS NICHOLAS DAVOUST, SON OF John Francis Davoust, the Lord of Annaoux, was born at Annoux, near Noyers, in Burgundy, of a noble family, on the 10th of May, 1770. In 1785, he entered the military school of Brienne, and, in 1789, became a sublieutenant in the regiment of the royal Champagne cavalry. He was created a major of the third battalion of the Yonne in 1791, and served, the following year, in the army of the North, under Dumourier, where he was distinguished at the battles of Jemappes and of Nerwinde. In 1793, he was made chief of brigade, and adjutant-general of brigade; but the decree against the noble families deprived him of command. The fall of Robespierre’s party, on the 27th of July, 1794, restored him to his profession; and he served, in 1795, under Pichegru, on the Rhine, and continued with the army of the Rhine during 1796 and 1797. He accompanied Napoleon to Egypt, and served there, with merit, during 1798 and 1799. In the following year he was made a general of division, and commanded the cavalry in the army of Italy. In 1801, he was appointed inspector-general of the cavalry, and commander of the infantry of the consular guard; and, in 1803, was commander-in-chief of the camp at Bruges. In 1804, he was created marshal of the empire, and a grand officer of the legion of honor. From this time till the end of the Russian campaign, he will be seen taking a very prominent and principal part in all the great actions of the army. In the campaign of 1805, he was at the head of the third corps of the grand army; and at the Rattle of Austerlitz, where he commanded the right wing, his obstinate valor contributed largely to the victory. In the campaigns of Prussia, in 1806, and of Poland, in 1807, he won immortal glory at Auerstadt and Eylau; and his services at this period occupy so large a part of the military history of Napoleon, that it is proper here to exhibit in full that portion of the life of the emperor in the field, which is embraced by

THE PRUSSIAN AND POLISH CAMPAIGNS OF 1806 AND 1807.

During the year 1806, the policy of Prussia, which had long been wavering and undecided, became fully determined against Napoleon; and the collision of France with the armies of the great Frederic was seen to be inevitable. The campaign opened in the beginning of October. Napoleon arrived at Wurzburg on the 3d, and his army, one hundred and fifty thousand strong, was then grouped around Bamberg and Cobourg. The Prussian force consisted of: thirty thousand under Prince Ruchel, forming the right wing, and stationed on Hesse; fifty-five thousand men forming the centre, under the king in person, with the aged duke of Brunswick as his lieutenant-general, assembled around Magdeburg; forty thousand men in Saxony under Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the king’s brother; and a detached corps of twelve thousand, under Blucher, in Westphalia. Confident in their military resources, and their long-established fame in the field, the Prussian leaders determined to march by their right upon Saalfield and Jena, turn the French left, and cut Napoleon off from the Rhine. This was an operation similar in character to that which had proved so fatal at Austerlitz, and as soon as it was fairly developed, Napoleon hastened to take advantage of it, and to fall upon the flank of the corps, which were then moving past his position. Early on the 9th, his whole army was pushed forward into Saxony by three roads. On the right, Ney and Soult marched on Plauen, and fell upon the Prussian magazines and reserve; in the centre, Murat, Davoust, and Bernadotte, marched on Saalbourg; while on the left, Lannes and Augereau advanced on Saalfield. On the 9th and 10th, the corps of Murat and Bernadotte fell upon detached bodies moving across the country, and disordered and drove them back: and Lannes on the left encountered the Prussian rear-guard, under Prince Louis, which was routed with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, twelve hundred prisoners, and thirty pieces of cannon, and the death of the prince himself. At the first intelligence of Napoleon’s movement, orders were given by the duke of Brunswick for all the troops to return, and concentrate about the king near Weimar, and Prince Hohenlohe near Jena. On the 12th, Hohenlohe with forty thousand men, was on the heights to the north of Jena, on the road to Weimar, with advanced posts on the Landgrafenberg, and the king of Prussia, with the duke of Brunswick, was about a league from Hohenlohe, nearer to Weimar, with sixty-five thousand men: Lannes was at Jena, Ney and Augereau in its immediate neighborhood, and Soult advancing upon the same place, while on the same day Murat, Davoust, and Bernadotte, were directed to march on Nuremberg, where important magazines were established. This last movement led the Prussian commander into an error which proved the fate of his armies and of his empire; for the king, alarmed for the safety of his magazines, advanced on the 13th with his corps, amounting to two thirds of the whole army, toward Suiza, and in the evening of that day reached Auerstadt, leaving Hohenlohe with forty thousand men to withstand Napoleon with ninety thousand. The Russian posts having been driven from the Langrafenberg, Napoleon on the 13th occupied it with the greater part of his army. It was between Jena and the heights on which Hohenlohe was established, and from it the emperor looked down upon the whole position of his enemies. On the night of the 13th, Augereau was stationed on the left of the mountain; Ney and Soult were ordered to march all night on the right, so as to attack the enemy on his left flank; Lannes’s corps was established on the ridge and flanks of the mountain, ready to assail in front; the imperial guard under Lefebvre were stationed on the summit, where Napoleon, wrapped in his cloak, bivouacked during the night; and Murat with the cavalry was in Jena. The Prussian army was on another more gradual eminence, separated from the Langrafenberg by low grounds of some extent: their centre was on the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, and their right extended toward Isserstadt: their rear rested on the villages of Cappellendorf and Romstedt, beyond which, Prince Ruchel was in reserve with twenty thousand men; and the front of their whole position was covered by the villages of Closwitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which their army was stationed. About six o’clock on the morning of the 19th, the French army was in motion: a heavy fog rested on the ground, and concealed their movements; and the low grounds in front, and the villages beyond them, were carried before the Prussians had any idea that a general attack was intended. About nine o’clock, the fog lifted, and the brilliant sun-rays revealed to Hohenlohe the splendid but appalling spectacle of Lannes’s corps ascending the slope in front of him, Ney’s and Soult’s advancing on his left, and Augereau rapidly turning his right. The Prussians, in admirable order, retreated along the eminence, to concentrate their force, and prevent their being outflanked, and to communicate with their reserves: but Ney, having captured a battery, and incurred a serious risk, from which Napoleon sent Bertrand to rescue him, now assaulted the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen on the left, while Lannes attacked it in front. It was finally carried, though with great loss, and Ney then fell upon the Prussian right wing, which, already pressed by Augereau on the other flank, speedily gave ground. On their left, the Prussian cavalry had gained some advantage till the solid lines of Soult’s corps advanced, and poured such a deadly fire upon them that they were driven in confusion upon the infantry: meanwhile, Lannes and Augereau, pushing forward on their part, the whole line of the French army advanced, driving the disordered Prussian masses before them. Ruchel’s reserve then appeared, laboring to stern the torrent of defeat; but it was too late: Napoleon, who, from his position on the summit of the mountain, was a spectator of every part of the field, had ordered Murat with his magnificent reserve of twelve thousand cavalry to advance. Ruchel was overborne by the resistless torrent; the entire Prussian army, routed and disorganized, was driven before the impetuous tide of conquest. The conquerors entered Weimar pell-mell with the fugitives; and Hohenlohe with difficulty rallied twenty squadrons of horse behind that town in the evening, which were the only relics of his army.

While this decisive victory was gaining at Jena, a far greater and more glorious battle was fought by Marshal Davoust at Auerstadt, and one of the most brilliant triumphs of skill and valor won that the annals of the whole revolutionary era record. When Lannes moved upon Jena, Davoust had been sent to Naumberg, and Bernadotte had been directed to advance to the intermediate position of Dornberg. Soon after midnight on the 13th-14th, the emperor, supposing that he had the whole Prussian army before him, sent renewed orders to Davoust to seize and hold the bridge of Naumberg over the Saale at all hazards, and, if practicable, to advance toward Apolda and fall upon the Prussian rear; Bernadotte, he added, if at hand, might co-operate in his movement, though it was hoped that he was already at Dornberg. Davoust, upon the receipt of this order, went at once to Bernadotte, who was at Naumberg, and proposed to act with him, and even offered to place himself under his command: but that marshal, jealous, cold, and malignant, chose to leave both the emperor and Davoust to the chances of failure; and observing that the order...