CHAPTER 3: BUCQUOY—CROISILLES—THE HINDENBURG LINE, BULLECOURT

THE GERMAN RETREAT WAS CARRIED out with great steadiness and skill, the bulk of their troops and heavy guns being removed under cover of small rearguards composed largely of machine guns and light artillery, and assisted by heavily wired lines of trenches, which had been in preparation months beforehand. Owing to the weather and the state of the roads, which were also mined before they were evacuated, our advance was necessarily slow, and great difficulty was experienced in moving even the field artillery forward and keeping them supplied with ammunition; still greater difficulty, as can be imagined, was found in moving the heavy guns. The infantry therefore did not obtain sufficient support from guns to enable them successfully to cope with the wire and machine guns with which the enemy opposed them at certain well-defined positions. The higher command, meanwhile, were anxious to press the enemy to the fullest extent and not to allow him to retire in his own time.

An attack was carried out at Bucquoy on March 13 by the Brigade. The Germans had been gradually pushed back through Puisieux to a line through Bucquoy which they intended to hold in order to admit of their removing their heavy guns and impedimenta further to the rear. This line was a very strong one, heavily defended by machine guns and thick wire. The original idea was to attack it, in conjunction with other divisions, with two brigades on the Divisional front, but on March 13 it was reported by aeroplanes that the line was not held in any strength and that there were indications of the enemy retiring from it. The Brigade at this time was holding the line and was to be relieved the next day by the two assaulting brigades. At about 1 p.m., however, orders were received to occupy the village with patrols and the front-line battalion was at once ordered to send patrols forward to find out the situation. Shortly after the receipt of the first order a second was received with definite instructions for an attack that night. Just after 3 p.m. the O.C. front-line battalion sent in the results of the patrols which he had sent out. There were four altogether, all of whom without exception reported the village strongly held by machine guns and the wire very thick and uncut. A report to this effect was sent in by the Brigadier, who expressed in writing his opinion that the attack was not a feasible proposition and that, as his battalions had only recently taken over the line, they did not know the ground; moreover, that there was not sufficient time to organise an attack by 11.45 that night, and that he considered that an attack at dawn would have a greater chance of success. The attack was however ordered to proceed, although at 1 a.m. in place of 11.45 p.m.; but although Zero hour was thus pushed forward, the original intention of bombarding the village from 10 to 10.30 p.m. was not altered, in spite of protests from the Brigadier. The consequence was that the active patrolling during the day and this bombardment such a long time before the actual operations of the infantry took place, put the enemy on the qui vive and gave him a very good indication of our intentions. As the Brigadier expected, the operation was a complete failure. At 1 a.m. the infantry moved forward. The night was exceptionally dark and the ground very heavy. The wire was found to be dense and impenetrable. The enemy’s artillery and machine-gun fire was intense as soon as operations started. In one place only was an entrance effected—on the extreme right of the attack. Here the right company of the right battalion, the 22nd Manchesters, got through the wire and established itself in the trench, which they held until the supply of bombs, both British and German, was exhausted. It was eventually driven out by a determined hostile counter-attack. Most of the surviving members of that company were captured. As soon as information reached Brigade Headquarters that the operation had been unsuccessful, the Brigadier ordered the troops to withdraw to their original line. In the course of the following twenty-four hours the Brigade was relieved.

The primary cause of this failure was the state of the wire. In viewing the position afterwards, when the Germans had withdrawn, it was not surprising that it was able to withstand an impromptu attack in pitch darkness and pouring rain by men to whom the ground was entirely new. The triple belt of wire was scarcely damaged and the trench in the rear of it was full of machine-gun emplacements carefully and skilfully placed to bring a cross fire to bear in front of it.

In his own time the enemy evacuated the Bucquoy line and, slowly followed by our advanced guards, withdrew further Eastwards, making no prolonged resistance to our advance until the comparatively high ground in front of the Hindenburg Line was reached, which formed an outpost position to the main line behind. In this portion of the line, this consisted of a ridge running between the villages of Croisilles and Ecoust and continued to North and South with small re-entrants running into it from the West, in one of which the village of Croisilles lay. It was a strong position, well defended by a trench system and a considerable amount of wire. Situated on a higher ridge, in rear of it, was the famous Hindenburg Line, with its lines of barbed wire which looked, when viewed from a distance, as if it were one solid block. A tough proposition to tackle, as indeed it proved itself to be.

Since March 25, one battalion of the Brigade had been holding the line facing the village of Croisilles which was heavily defended by trenches, wire, and machine guns; it moreover lay in a hollow, as already pointed out, and therefore was a difficult place to attack unless the high ground on either side of it could be taken and held. This meant a very wide extension of front. Nevertheless, it was decided that an attempt should be made to carry it with one brigade as it was an important tactical point for further operations. It was however pointed out by the Brigadier, whose Brigade had been detailed for this duty, that one brigade was not sufficient to cope with such a big objective, the front of attack being alone 1,500 yards, with a defensive flank, if the operation was successful, of a further 1,200 yards. An additional difficulty lay in the fact that the wire had not been properly cut in front of the village, which being in a hollow was screened from proper observation by the artillery observing officers, which rendered the cutting of the wire very difficult and problematical. However, it was essential that the village should be taken, or that some indication should be obtained of how it was held and in what strength, so the operation was ordered to proceed.

On the night of March 27, the line of posts East of St. Leger and opposite Croisilles, held by one battalion of the Brigade, were taken over by two fresh battalions, the 1st S. Staffordshires and the 22nd Manchesters, who were to make the assault. The relieved battalion, the 21st Manchesters, went back to rest-billets, and the fourth battalion of the Brigade, the 2nd Queens, moved up early in the morning of the 28th to a position of readiness near Brigade Headquarters, to support the attack. The task of the left battalion, the 1st S. Staffordshires, was to make good the high ground North of the village, and the right battalion, the 22nd Manchesters, had a similar task on the South, the scheme being that both these attacks should effect a junction on the Eastern exit of the village and thus completely surround it; a small proportion of each battalion only was to work through the village. The assaulting battalions were to be formed up on a line 200 yards beyond the edge of St. Leger wood by Zero minus 30 minutes, and were then to advance 300 yards so as to be close under the barrage by Zero hour. The attack was launched at 5.45 a.m. on March 28. Both companies of the 22nd Manchesters were met with heavy machine-gun fire and failed to penetrate the wire, which was uncut except for a small gap. At one place however twelve men under a very gallant officer, Captain Duguid, of the 22nd Manchesters, cut a passage through the wire and established themselves in the enemy lines where they remained for thirty-six hours till relieved. The remainder of the battalion dug themselves in near the wire till nightfall, when they were ordered to withdraw to the original line. On the left, the right company of the 1st S. Staffordshires was immediately held up by very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, but had nevertheless succeeded in advancing a considerable distance. The supporting company became absorbed in this attack, and a mixed party worked close up to the enemy wire. Here they were heavily counter-attacked, but drove the attack back and inflicted considerable casualties. Owing to their exposed situation and the severity of the fire to which they were subjected, this party was eventually forced to withdraw about 100 yards to a sunken road, where they dug in and remained throughout the day. Meanwhile the left company had advanced successfully a considerable distance towards their objective, but were eventually held up by heavy enfilade and frontal machine gun and rifle fire. Owing to the failure of the right company to advance, a considerable gap had been formed between the two companies. What happened afterwards to this company is very obscure, but probably, after maintaining their isolated position under very heavy fire for two hours, they were heavily counter-attacked from the German main position and completely enveloped. All except the left platoon, who were acting as a defensive flank, became casualties, or were taken prisoners. A...